BRICS after New Delhi: how far can India's multilateral bet go

The brief in 8 cards

1. Context1 / 8
   • India hosted the 18th BRICS Summit at Bharat Mandapam, New Delhi, on 12–13 September 2026.
   • This was India's fourth BRICS chairship, after 2012, 2016 and 2021.
   • The theme was "Building for Resilience, Innovation, Cooperation and Sustainability".
   • Leaders adopted the New Delhi Declaration by consensus.
   • The Hindu's editorial argues that for India, BRICS works less as a single bloc and more as one platform among several, useful for engaging different powers without full commitment to any of them.
2. Key highlights2 / 8

   A platform, not an alliance: For India, BRICS offers a diplomatic space to engage Russia, China, Iran and Gulf countries at once, without tying its foreign policy to one power bloc.

   Contradictions persist: Members differ sharply on geopolitics and security. Even so, the 2026 summit still produced a consensus declaration.

   "Rule-shapers", not "rule-takers": India used its chairship to push for a bigger Global South voice in bodies like the UN Security Council.

   Beyond geopolitics: The grouping is building cooperation in cross-border payments, science and technology, disaster resilience, trade, taxation, urbanisation and industry.

   No forced choice: The editorial says India does not need to choose between BRICS and its Western partnerships. It can hold both through issue-based coalitions and diversified ties.

   Scale of the effort: India's 2026 chairship involved more than 350 meetings across 25 cities. [VERIFY: Confirm this figure against an official BRICS 2026 source.]

3. Key concepts3 / 8
   1. Multi-alignment

   • Multi-alignment means a country engages with several power centres or groupings at once, instead of joining one bloc exclusively.
   • Analogy: it is like a professional who keeps memberships in several networks, drawing benefits from each, rather than committing to only one employer.
   • This differs from non-alignment, the Cold War-era policy of staying formally outside both major blocs.
   • Multi-alignment accepts active membership in many groupings, even ones with different or opposing members.

   News connection: India's simultaneous membership in BRICS, the Quad, the SCO and the G20 is the clearest example of this approach.

   2. Strategic autonomy

   • Strategic autonomy is a country's ability to decide its own foreign and security policy, without being bound to follow any single power's line.
   • It does not mean isolation. It means keeping the freedom to choose, issue by issue.
   • Analogy: a country with strategic autonomy is like a person who can borrow ideas and support from several friends, without becoming dependent on any one of them.

   News connection: BRICS gives India one more channel for engaging Russia and China, while it keeps separate, strong ties with the United States and Europe.

   3. The Ezulwini Consensus and UN Security Council reform

   • The Ezulwini Consensus (2005) is the African Union's common position demanding at least two permanent African seats, with veto power, on an expanded Security Council.
   • The Sirte Declaration builds on this African position.
   • India and Brazil separately seek permanent seats for themselves in a reformed Council.
   • Distinction: The Ezulwini Consensus speaks for African representation as a continent. India and Brazil's claims are national.

   News connection: The New Delhi Declaration backed the Ezulwini Consensus, alongside China's and Russia's support for India's and Brazil's own aspirations.

   4. BRICS Plus and outreach diplomacy

   • BRICS Plus is the practice of inviting non-member countries and international organisations to summit sessions, widening BRICS's reach beyond its own members.
   • This lets BRICS engage the wider Global South without the difficulty of formally admitting every interested country.
   • India hosted this outreach segment during its 2026 chairship.

   News connection: The editorial notes that BRICS increasingly works as a hub for wider Global South cooperation, not just a closed club of members.

4. Way forward4 / 8

   Use BRICS for issues, not identity: India can draw on BRICS for specific goals such as Global South representation and economic cooperation, without treating it as a substitute for other partnerships.

   Keep every channel open: Continue strong bilateral and smaller multilateral ties with the US, EU, Japan and other partners alongside BRICS.

   Push institutional reform patiently: Keep using BRICS as one more voice for UN and global governance reform, alongside other forums.

5. Note5 / 8

   BRICS's expanding membership

   Founding members: Brazil, Russia, India and China formed the original "BRIC" grouping in 2009. South Africa joined in 2010, making it BRICS.

   2024 expansion: Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran and the United Arab Emirates joined as full members.

   Saudi Arabia's unusual status: India's government has called Saudi Arabia a full member since January 2024. Saudi Arabia itself has continued to describe its participation using "invited country" language. [VERIFY: Confirm Saudi Arabia's current official status before treating it as settled.]

   2026 addition: Indonesia joined, taking the count that India's chairship uses to 11 members: Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Indonesia.

   Why this matters for exams: The exact member count is a live, disputed fact. Different sources give 10 or 11 depending on how they treat Saudi Arabia.

6. Note6 / 8

   BRICS's economic weight and its limits

   Large on paper: The expanded BRICS represents about 39% of global GDP in PPP terms, 49% of global population and 23% of global trade, according to the supplied notes. [VERIFY: Confirm these figures against an official BRICS or IMF source before publishing.]

   Trade has grown, but stayed small: Intra-BRICS merchandise trade rose from US$84 billion in 2003 to US$1.17 trillion in 2024. Even so, it remains only about 5% of global trade.

   Reading this gap: A large share of world population and output does not automatically mean members trade heavily with each other. Members often trade more with the rest of the world than among themselves.

   The institutions doing the real work:

   • New Development Bank (NDB): Finances infrastructure and sustainable development projects, outside the older Bretton Woods institutions such as the World Bank.
   • Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA): A pool of foreign exchange reserves that members can draw on for short-term liquidity support, similar in spirit to the IMF's role but run by BRICS members themselves.
7. Note7 / 8

   Where BRICS still pulls apart

   India–China rivalry: Border disputes and strategic competition limit how far the two countries can act together inside BRICS.

   Different big-power postures: India keeps strong ties with the United States, while Russia and China favour more active resistance to Western dominance. A single, shared geopolitical line is hard to build.

   West Asian tensions inside the bloc: Iran, Saudi Arabia and the UAE do not share the same regional security priorities, which complicates finding common ground.

   Bigger bloc, harder consensus: More members bring more voices and more legitimacy, but also make agreement slower and joint statements more diluted.

   An implementation gap: Because BRICS runs on consensus, leaders often agree on political language without every member following through equally on the ground.

   Money matters, too: Settling trade in local currencies still runs into problems of convertibility, liquidity and exchange-rate risk. This is why the editorial favours building interoperable payment systems first, rather than rushing toward a shared BRICS currency.

8. Note8 / 8

   

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